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A Uniform Probate Code
Indian Country
a:
By David M. English
he estates of most deceased
American Indians are adminis-
tered under a differ nt system
than are the estates of other Americans.
Much Indian wealth is derived from
allotment of tribal lands. Tribal lands
were originally held by the tribes as a
whole. But between 1887 and 1934,
substantial portions of tribal lands
were allotted into parcels for individual
Indians and what was left was often
opened to homestead by non-Indians.
The individual allotments are held in
"trust" or "restricted" title for the
Indian owners by the U.S. government.
David M. English is the W. F.
Fratcher Professor of Law at the
University of Missouri-Columbia, a
member of the Advisory Committee
to the Special Trustee for American
Indians of the U.S. Department of the
Interior, the executive director of the
Joint Editorial Board for Uniform
Trusts and Estates Acts, and a mem-
ber of the Executive Committee of the
ABA Section of Real Property, Probate
& Trust Law.
Except for a minority of allotted lands
that are managed directly by their
owners, the federal government leases
the trust or restricted land, collects the
rents, and periodically distributes the
net rental to the owners. Undistributed
rentals from trust or restricted lands are
held in individual Indian money (IM)
accounts. On the death of an Indian
owner, the disposition of trust or
restricted lands and 1IM accounts is
governed by federal law and the estate
is administered by the Department of
the Interior.
Tribes are free to enact probate
codes governing disposition of all a
tribal member's property, both allotted
lands and other assets, but few tribes
have done so. Absent enactment of a
tribal probate code, lands owned by
Indians not subject to federal jurisdic-
tion (referred to as "fee" or "taxable"
land) and personal property other than
IIM accounts are subject to state law.
Federal law allows for the execution
of wills for the disposition of trust or
restricted lands and 1IM accounts. 25
U.S.C. § 373. The federal requirements
for executing a will are similar to the
requirements in the states. Two wit-
nesses are necessary and provision is
made for self-proof through notariza-
tion. 43 C.ER. §§ 4.233, 4.260. If an
Indian owns assets subject to both fed-
eral and state probate, there is no need
to execute two wills. Unless a state's
requirements for executing a will are
unusual, compliance with the execu-
tion requirements for the Indian's state
of residence also will meet the federal
requirements. In addition, enough dis-
putes have arisen for a body of admin-
istrative case law to have developed on
the grounds for contest. Federal law
also controls the will's interpretation,
although here the law is less devel-
oped. It is uncertain which rules on
construction of wills apply and, if
applicable, the details of their
application.
Most Indians, however, do not make
wills but instead die intestate. Many
Indians have large families, and sales
of trust or restricted lands, whether
within or without the family, are rare.
This combination of large families and
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Camille George, left, her daughter Rose Ann Abrahamson, center, and granddaughter Leela Abrahamson pose in the Lemhi Valley near Salmon,
Idaho, Oct. 26, 2002. The Shoshone women trace their ancestry directly to Chief Cameahwait, brother of Sacajawea, who helped the Lewis and
Clark Expedition at a critical point.
intestate succession has resulted in
severe fractionation of title to allotted
lands, particularly among the tribes
whose lands were allotted a century or
more ago. Because the heirs will typi-
cally be the owner's several children,
who in turn may have large families,
over several generations the number of
owners can reach exponential propor-
tions. It is not unusual for trust lands to
have over 100 individual owners, each
owning minute interests. It is also not
unusual for an individual Indian to
own interests in a score or more
parcels, sometimes located in multiple
states.
The problem of fractionation is not
new but has been recognized in
numerous congressional reports dating
back to the early 20th century. Nothing
much was done about the problem
until enactment of the Indian Land
Consolidation Act of 1983 (ILCA), Pub.
L. No. 97-459, 96 Stat. 2515. ILCA
authorizes tribes to develop land con-
solidation plans, which could include
tribal purchase of fractionated interests.
ILCA also permits tribes to enact laws
restricting inheritance by nonmembers
of the tribe. Most significantly, LCA
provided for the escheat to the tribe of
an interest of less than 2% on its
owner's death. But this escheat provi-
sion was ruled unconstitutional as a
violation of due process in Hodel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), and an
amended version was thrown out in
Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997).
Barred from applying escheat to
limit further fractionation, Congress
next attacked the problem through
reform of the probate process. The
ILCA Amendments of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-462, 114 Stat. 1991, enacted
major reforms in probate, but many
tribes objected, asserting that the
amendments had received insufficient
tribal consultation. The 2000 amend-
ments, which were made contingent on
certification by the Secretary of the
Interior, were never implemented.
The American Indian Probate
Reform Act of 2004 (AIPRA), Pub. L.
No. 108-374, 118 Stat. 1773, which was
signed by the President on October 27,
2004, will not suffer the same fate.
Unlike its predecessor, AIPRA was
enacted following extensive consulta-
tion in Indian country. Also, shortly
after enactment the Secretary began
work on implementation.
AIPRA makes major reforms to the
Indian probate system. Federal law
long provided that trust or restricted
lands and IlM accounts owned by an
Indian intestate are to be distributed to
the heirs as determined under state
law. AIPRA replaces this with one uni-
form intestacy scheme for the distribu-
tion of trust lands and IJIM accounts in
lieu of the 30-plus state systems that
now apply. AIPRA also fills out the fed-
eral law on wills, enacting numerous
provisions on the interpretation of
wills, most adapted from the Uniform
Probate Code. In addition to providing
Indian country with a uniform and
more complete body of probate law,
AIPRA contains several provisions
encouraging the purchase or consolida-
tion of fractionated interests. AIPRA
affects ownership rights in trust or
restricted lands in all states other than
Alaska.
The probate provisions of AIPRA
take effect on June 20, 2006, one year
after a notice of the Act was sent to
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approximately 290,000 landowners.
Other provisions of AIPRA take effect
on varying dates continuing through
2007. AIPRA and ILCA are codified at
25 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2221.
Intestate Succession
The modem purpose of intestate suc-
cession statutes is to accomplish what
the average decedent would likely
have done had the decedent made a
will. Most Americans who make wills
and who were married only once leave
their entire estates to their surviving
spouses. Recognizing this strong pref-
erence, the 1990 Uniform Probate Code
and a growing number of state intesta-
cy statutes grant the surviving spouse
the entire estate unless the decedent
also was survived by a descendant
from another relationship.
The intestate succession provisions
of AIPRA are based on different
assumptions. Spousal rights under
AIPRA are significantly less than under
state law, there is a preference for
retaining property within the tribe, and
the continued fractionation of small
interests is disfavored. Should a tribe
be dissatisfied with the results under
AIPRA, the tribe is free to enact its own
superseding probate code.
Under AIPRA, the key factor in
determining heirs is the decedent's per-
centage ownership in the relevant
parcels of trust or restricted lands.
Different provisions apply if the dece-
dent's ownership interest in a parcel is
less than 5%. Also, the class of relatives
who can inherit is limited. Other than
for the spouse, inheritance is allowed
only by an "eligible heir," a class that
may include only Indians, a child or
grandchild of an Indian, or another
person who is already a co-owner of
the same parcel. 25 U.S.C. § 2201(9).
Property that would otherwise pass to
a relative who fails to qualify as an eli-
gible heir instead passes to the tribe or,
if no tribe has jurisdiction over the trust
interest, to the other co-owners.
The limitation of "eligible heirs" to
Indians and close descendants of
Indians was a source of controversy
during the drafting of AIPRA. Because
of intermarriage, an increasing percent-
age of individuals have less than the
25% blood quantum required for mem-
bership in many tribes. Should mem-
bers of different tribes marry, it is also
not unusual for their offspring not to
qualify as a member of any tribe
despite having a high percentage of
Indian blood.
The only collateral relatives who
may inherit under AIPRA are the dece-
dent's brothers and sisters. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2206(a)(2)(B). Inheritance by nieces
and nephews and more distant collat-
eral relatives is not allowed. The prop-
erty will instead pass to the tribe. The
limitation on the categories of collateral
relatives who may inherit is more
restrictive than state law. In many








decedent made a will.
tant, may potentially inherit. Even
under the Uniform Probate Code
§ 2-103, inheritance is cut off only if the
decedent was not survived by a
descendant of a grandparent or closer
relative. Under the UPC, potential heirs
can include uncles and aunts, first
cousins, and their descendants, all of
whom are prohibited from inheriting
under AIPRA.
Share of Spouse
The spouse receives one-third of the
personalty (that is, IIM account) out-
right if the decedent also was survived
by an eligible heir or all of the person-
alty if no eligible heir survives. 25
U.S.C. § 2206(a)(2)(A). Trust or restrict-
ed lands are treated differently. If the
decedent owned 5% or more of a par-
ticular parcel, the spouse receives a life
estate. If the decedent's interest was
less than 5%, the spouse receives noth-
ing unless the spouse was living in a
residence on the parcel. In such a case,
the spouse may continue to occupy the
residence for life. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2206(a)(2)(D).
Share of Eligible Heirs
Trust or restricted lands and TIM
accounts not passing to the spouse, or
the entire estate if the decedent was not
survived by a spouse, pass to the eligi-
ble heirs. Personalty and a 5% or more
interest in a parcel of trust or restricted
land pass in the following order of
priority:
" children in equal shares, with the
share of a predeceased child to be
divided among that child's
children (that is, grandchildren
of decedent),
" great-grandchildren in equal
shares,
" surviving parent or parents in
equal shares, and
* surviving siblings in equal shares.
25 U.S.C. § 2206(a)(2)(B). If all of the
children are deceased, distribution
among the grandchildren is not equal
but is per stirpital based on the
parental roots. If no person in any of
the above classes survives, the property
passes to the tribe or, if no tribe has
jurisdiction over the trust interest,
to the other co-owners. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2206(a)(2)(C).
Single Heir Rule
To stem further fractionation, interests
in trust or restricted lands of less than
5% pass to a single heir. The oldest sur-
viving child takes all or, if no child sur-
vives, the oldest surviving grandchild
takes all; if no grandchild survives, the
oldest surviving great-grandchild takes
all. If no person in these classes sur-
vives, the interest passes to the tribe or,
if no tribe has jurisdiction over the trust
interest, to the other co-owners. 25
U.S.C. § 2206(a)(2)(D). The single heir
rule may be AIPRA's most important
provision. Unless the owner executes a
will that further divides the interest,
the single heir rule will stop further
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fractionation of these small interests.
The single heir rule has an antecedent
in the British doctrine of primogeni-
ture. But primogeniture applied only to
the male line. AIPRA treats men and
women equally. The oldest survivor in
the generation takes all regardless of
sex.
120-Hour Survivorship
Similar to Uniform Probate Code
§ 2-702, a person is not eligible to take
as an heir or devisee unless the person
survives the decedent by at least 120
hours. 25 U.S.C. § 2206(a)(4), (k)(4).
Testamentary Dispositions
AIPRA does not change the require-
ments for executing an Indian will but
it does add numerous provisions relat-
ing to the interpretation and construc-
tion of wills, most of which are adapt-
ed from the Uniform Probate Code.
Included are provisions relating to
lapsed devises, slayers, omitted spous-
es and children, effect of divorce, dis-
claimers, and interpretation of class
gifts and terms of relationship. 25
U.S.C. § 2206(b), (i)-(k).
More unusual is a rule of construc-
tion providing that an interest devised
to two or more devisees is presumed to
be held by the devisees as joint tenants
with right of survivorship. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2206(c). This provision, intended to
encourage consolidation of title, is the
opposite of standard doctrine, which
presumes that a transfer to two or
more persons without further indica-
tion creates a tenancy in common.
Another unusual provision relates to
disposition of a family cemetery plot; it
passes by intestacy and not as part of
the residue unless the will specifically
refers to the plot. 25 U.S.C. § 2206(i)(7).
The major reason for executing a
will is to distribute assets differently
than provided by intestate succession.
AIPRA clarifies that Indians, like other
Americans, may execute wills leaving
their estates to anyone. Indians dissatis-
fied with the single heir rule may exe-
cute wills distributing trust or restrict-
ed lands to their children in equal
shares. Indians with relatives who are
not Indian may leave their estates,
including trust or restricted lands, to
these individuals. Property devised to
any lineal descendant, a co-owner, the
tribe, or to another Indian retains its
trust or restricted status. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2206(b)(1). Property devised to any-
one else loses its trust or restricted sta-
tus unless the ineligible person was
devised only a life estate. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2206(b)(2).
Estate Planning Assistance
AIPRA requires that estate planning
assistance be provided to Indian
landowners to the extent that funds are
appropriated for this purpose. 25
U.S.C. § 2206(0(1). The purpose of such
assistance is to dramatically increase
the use of wills, substantially reduce
the number of intestate estates, and
help Indian landowners obtain infor-
mation concerning their trust or
restricted holdings. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2206(f)(2). Ironically, enactment of
AIPRA has led the Bureau of Indian
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Affairs to conclude that it will no
longer assist in the drafting of Indian
wills. Although this revision of BIA
policy is certainly laudable from the
perspective of the unauthorized prac-
tice of law, it heightens the need for a
knowledge of AIPRA among the legal
profession and for lawyers to take a
more active role in the drafting of
Indian wills.
Purchase and Consolidation
Expanding on the provisions originally
enacted as part of ILCA, AIPRA adds
several provisions designed to encour-
age consolidation of title to allotted
lands. The most significant new device
is a provision authorizing the partition
sale of "highly fractionated Indian
Expanding on the
provisions originally






title to allotted lands.
land." This defined term includes land
having more than 100 owners and land
having 50 to 100 owners if no person
owns an interest greater than 10%. 25
U.S.C. § 2201(6). A partition action may
be initiated either by the tribe having
jurisdiction over the parcel or by a co-
owner entitled to bid at the sale. 25
U.S.C. § 2204(d)(2)(A). The sale is not
public. Bidders are limited to (1) the
tribe having jurisdiction over the par-
cel, (2) members of or persons eligible
to become members of that tribe, and
(3) co-owners and descendants of an
original allottee who are members or
eligible to become members of any
tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 2204(d)(2)(I)(i).
Consent to the partition sale also must
be obtained from (1) the tribe having
jurisdiction over the parcel if the tribe
owns an undivided interest in the par-
cel, (2) any co-owner who during the
preceding three years has maintained
a residence or operated a business on
the parcel, and (3) the co-owners of at
least 50% of the undivided interests if
the value of any owner's interest is
greater than $1,500. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2204(d)(2)(D)(i).
The addresses or identities of a
sizeable percentage of Indian allot-
ment owners are unknown or unde-
termined. To facilitate partition,
AIPRA authorizes the Secretary of the
Interior to consent to partition on
behalf of missing or unknown owners.
25 U.S.C. § 2204(d)(2)(D)(ii). The pro-
ceeds of a partition sale that are alloca-
ble to missing or unknown owners
will stay on deposit in Department of
Interior accounts, theoretically in
perpetuity.
Also new is a provision granting
an option to purchase a parcel dur-
ing a probate proceeding. A purchase
may be made either by (1) an eligible
heir or devisee of the property,
(2) the other co-owners of the parcel,
or (3) the tribe having jurisdiction
over the parcel. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2 206(p)(2). No purchase during
probate is allowed unless consent is
first obtained from the heirs or
devisees not participating in the pur-
chase and from the surviving spouse,
if any, receiving a life estate in the
property. 25 U.S.C. § 2206(p)(3)(B).
Other than for an heir residing on
the land, however, consent is waived
if the decedent died intestate and the
heir whose consent would otherwise
be required will receive less than a
5% interest in the parcel. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2206(p)(5).
Toward a New Model
A system in which an allotted parcel
has hundreds of owners is not eco-
nomically efficient. Accounting for
these interests is difficult and expen-
sive. Unlike a private trust, this
expense is not paid from the trust
property itself, but is paid for by the
U.S. government as part of its trust
responsibility to the tribes and trust
beneficiaries. Although self-manage-
ment by the Indian owners may be
arranged at the owners' request,
most of these interests are so small
that there is little incentive to take
this step. It is also unrealistic.
Attorneys often counsel against the
creation of tenancies in common hav-
ing even two owners because of the
difficult management problems that
can arise. A typical allotted parcel of
Indian land will have 20, 50, or even
100 or more owners.
AIPRA encourages the develop-
ment of other methods of manage-
ment akin to those typically used by
real estate developers and their coun-
sel. Specifically, the Secretary, follow-
ing consultation with the tribes, indi-
vidual landowner organizations, and
Indian advocacy organizations, is
directed to implement a pilot project
for the creation of entities such as
private or family trusts, partnerships,
corporations, or other organizations
to improve, facilitate, and assist in
the efficient management of allotted
lands. 25 U.S.C. § 2206(m)(1).
Whether such business models will
work in a culture with deep personal
attachment to the land and a desire
to retain a piece of ancestral heritage
is another matter. The better tack
would have been for Congress to
have devised a legislative solution
several decades ago when the frac-
tionation problem was serious but
still possible to solve. N
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Keeping Current-Probate Editor:
Prof. Gerry W. Beyer, Texas Tech
University School of Law, Lubbock,
TX 79409, gwb@ProfessorBeyer.com.
Contributors include Dave L.
Cornfeld, Claire G. Hargrove,
Christopher L. Harris, and Prof.
William P. LaPiana.
Keeping Current-Probate offers a
look at selected recent cases, rulings
and regulations, literature, and legisla-
tion. The editors of Probate & Property
welcome suggestions and contributions
from readers.
APPORTIONMENT: Trust created
for surviving spouse required to pay
estate tax because of inclusion of
trusts for the decedent's children in
his gross estate. The decedent held a
power of appointment over several
trusts for his children. The court in
Lurie v. Commissioner, 425 E3d 1021
(7th Cir. 2005), held that the value of
these trusts was includible in his
gross estate. The estate tax triggered
by the inclusion exhausted the pro-
bate estate and was payable from a
revocable trust established for his
wife rather than from the trusts for
his children that generated the estate
tax. Accordingly, the marital deduc-
tion was reduced. The court recog-
nized that if the decedent had real-
ized that this would happen, he
would not have included a provision
in the marital trust that it was respon-
sible for the estate taxes and instead
would have provided for estate taxes
to be apportioned to the trusts trig-
gering the tax. Nevertheless, the court
explained that it could not rewrite the
decedent's estate plan.
CY PRES: Services provided by sub-
stitute beneficiary must be within
same geographic area as original
beneficiary. The decedent's will creat-
ed two charitable trusts, one for each
of two hospitals, both of which were
listed by name and location. One of
the hospitals was acquired by a for-
profit corporation and could no
longer be the recipient of trust distri-
butions. The trial court ordered that
the trust income be paid to the other
hospital. On appeal, the court upheld
the use of cy pres but vacated the
decree directing payment, holding
that permissible recipients of the trust
income must provide health services
in the same geographic area served by
the former not-for-profit hospital. In re
Estate of Elkins, 888 A.2d 815 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2005).
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP:
Survivor of a Vermont civil union
could not maintain a wrongful death
action under New York law. In Langan
v. St. Vincent's Hosp. of New York, 802
N.YS.2d 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005), a
divided court overruled the trial court
and held that the survivor of a
Vermont civil union could not maintain
a wrongful death action on the same
basis as a spouse because the Vermont
civil union is not a "marriage."
FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP:
No discount allowed for nonbinding
restrictions. A family limited partner-
ship contained restrictive provisions.
Because of these restrictions, the donor
attempted to obtain a marketability
discount for gift tax purposes. The
court in Smith v. United States, No.
02-264 ERIE, 2005 WL 3021918 (W.D.
Pa. July 22, 2005), disregarded the
restrictions because the donor had a
sufficiently large ownership interest in
the partnership to amend the partner-
ship agreement to eliminate the restric-
tions.
FIDUCIARY DUTY: Jury instruction
must include indication that the sett-
lor may alter duties in the trust instru-
ment. In a complex security fraud case,
the Supreme Court of Texas addressed
the propriety of a jury instruction
regarding breach of fiduciary duty. The
instruction failed to reflect the possibili-
ty that the standard of care could be
modified by agreement. Because the
instruction did not account for contrac-
tual modifications, the court deter-
mined it was overly broad and conse-
quently defective. Sterling Trust Co. v.
Adderley, 168 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2005).
GROSS ESTATE: Recording data
determinative of ownership of real
property. In Estate of Maniglia v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 427
(2005), the court found that the dece-
dent, as the sole beneficiary of a trust,
was the sole owner of a real estate
interest, rather than a one-half owner
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as reported. In making the determina-
tion, the court relied on various docu-
ments filed in the real property records.
Consequently, the entire value of the
property was included in the dece-
dent's gross estate.
HOMESTEAD: Probate homestead
did not exist in property held as joint
tenants with rights of survivorship. In
Seehafer v. Seehafer, 704 N.W.2d 841
(N.D. 2005), the court held that a sur-
viving spouse had no homestead rights
in property held by the deceased
spouse and a third party as joint ten-
ants with right of survivorship.
Because the decedent's interest ended
at death, there was nothing against
which the surviving spouse could
make a claim.
MARITAL DEDUCTION: Flaw in
will ignored to carry out the testator's
intent to have the estate qualify for
the marital deduction. The testator
wrote his own will shortly after the
enactment of the unlimited marital
deduction. His will, however, con-
tained a provision that would prevent
the bequest to his spouse from qualify-
ing for the marital deduction because it
required that she survive until distribu-
tion of the estate. The court in Sowder v.
United States, No. CV-02-0136-WFN,
2005 WL 3610011 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 10,
2005), examined the totality of the cir-
cumstances to determine that the testa-
tor intended the bequest to qualify for
the marital deduction and disregarded
the negative inconsistent disqualifying
survival condition.
NO CONTEST CLAUSE: Clause
applied separately to marital deduc-
tion and exempt trusts. At the death of
a husband, the revocable trust created
by the husband and his wife divided
into an irrevocable trust funded with
the applicable exclusion amount and a
marital deduction trust amendable by
the survivor. The original trust includ-
ed a no contest clause. After the sur-
vivor's death, one of the couple's chil-
dren wished to challenge amendments
made to the marital trust. The court
upheld the trial court's determination
under Cal. Prob. Code § 21320 that a
challenge to the marital trust was not a
challenge to the exempt trust and could
not result in forfeiture of an interest in
that trust. Mclndoe v. Olivos, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
POWERS OF APPOINTMENT:
Requirement of specific reference sat-
isfied by substantial compliance. A
husband's will granted his wife a gen-
eral testamentary power of appoint-
ment over trust property to be exer-
cised by "specific reference." The wife's
will stated her intention to dispose of
all property including any "as to which
I may have a general power of appoint-
ment by will." The intermediate appel-
late court overturned summary judg-
ment for the takers in default, holding
that under Kentucky law a require-
ment of specific reference may be met
by substantial compliance and that the
wife's will met that standard. Hudson v.
Old Nat'l Trust, No. 2004-CA-001468-
MR, 2005 WL 2323344 (Ky. Ct. App.
Sept. 23, 2005).
TRUST FUNDING: Assignments of
IRA and brokerage account deemed
sufficient to fund trust. The decedent
had created a revocable trust and trans-
ferred to it the assets listed on
"Schedule A," which listed an IRA and
a brokerage account. Affirming the
lower court, the Ohio intermediate
appellate court held that both assets
were trust property, the assignment
being sufficient to end the beneficiary
designation under the IRA agreement.
Stephenson v. Stephenson, 836 N.E.2d 628
(Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
TRUST INTERPRETATION: Support
includes the support of the beneficia-
ry's family. In In re Estate of Stevens v.
Lutch, 617 S.E.2d 736 (S.C. Ct. App.
2005), the court held that a grant of dis-
cretion to a trustee to distribute princi-
pal and income for the "support" of a
beneficiary allows the trustee to make
distributions to pay for the private edu-
cation of a beneficiary's minor children.
TRUST REVOCATION: Joint power
to revoke does not limit the power of
a sole surviving trustee to revoke. A
husband and a wife created a joint rev-
ocable trust reserving to themselves the
power to revoke and stating that a sale
or other disposition of the trust proper-
ty "by us" would be a revocation. A
divided appellate court held that the
husband, as the sole surviving trustee,
had the power to convey trust property
and thus revoke the trust. Scalfaro v.
Rudloff, 884 A.2d 904 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2005).
TRUSTEE LIABILITY: A trustee may
be liable under a state's consumer
protection act. An accountant and self-
described "professional trustee" was
found liable for breaching fiduciary
duties owed to client-beneficiaries and
also was held liable under the
Massachusetts Consumer Protection
Act. The intermediate appellate court
affirmed, holding that the defendant
was engaged in the conduct of an
enterprise. In this case, the use of the
trust form was a sham to enable him to
gain access to his clients' funds for his
own purposes. Quinton v. Gavin, 835
N.E.2d 1124 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
VALUATION: Estate tax valuation of
an IRA was not entitled to a discount
for the income tax liability resulting
from distributions to beneficiaries.
The court in Estate of Kahn v.
Commissioner, 125 T.C. No. 11 (2005),
reasoned that a willing buyer would
not have such liability and would pay
full value.
VALUATION: Minority and mar-
ketability discounts allowed for
94.83% interest in family limited part-
nership. In Estate of Kelley v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 369
(2005), the court allowed a 12% minori-
ty discount and a 23% marketability
discount for the decedent's 94.83%
interest in a family limited partnership
whose assets consisted of cash and cer-
tificates of deposit.
CHARITABLE REMAINDER
TRUSTS: Court modifications of
CRUT requiring the beneficiaries to
pay the estate tax if necessary to per-
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mit funding of the trust before a final
determination of the estate tax did not
cause trust to cease to qualify under
Code § 664. PLR 200539022.
ESTATE TAX: The use of a private
trust company when discretionary
distribution powers were restricted to
independent directors did not cause
the trust assets to be included in the
decedent's estate. PLR 200531004.
GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANS-
FER TAX: Failure to exercise nonlaps-
ing power of withdrawal is not a
constructive addition for GST tax
purposes. The property, however, will
be included in the child's estate at
death and child will be deemed the
transferor. PLR 200540004.
Breach of Trust. Peter T. Wendel argues
that eliminating the common law
broad duty of inquiry would substan-
tially reduce the transaction costs for
third parties interested in dealing with
a trustee, thereby improving efficiency.
The, Evolution of the Law of Trustee's
Powers and Third Party Liability for
Participating in a Breach of Trust: An
Economic Analysis, 35 Seton Hall L. Rev.
971 (2005).
Celebrity Rights. In Wills, Trusts,
Schadenfreude, and the Wild Wacky Right
of Publicity: Exploring the Enforceability of
Dead-Hand Restrictions, 58 Ark. L. Rev.
43 (2005), William A. Drennan propos-
es that a celebrity should be able to
stop uses that ostracize the celebrity
from society but should not be able to
stop uses that merely bring the celebri-
ty "back to earth."
Illinois. In Three New Illinois Laws
Affect Estate-Planning Practice, 93 Ill.
B.J. 600 (2005), David A. Berek
reviews the Illinois estate tax that was
modified to account for property in
other states, the changes to limited
liability law addressing operating
agreements that create one or more
series of members, and the
Disposition of Remains Act.
Nebraska. Tracy M. Mason discusses
the protections still available to attor-
neys who are accused of malpractice
regarding wills in Privity, Duty, and
Loss: In Swanson v. Ptak, the Nebraska
Supreme Court Again Endorses Privity
in Legal Malpractice Actions, 84 Neb. L.
Rev. 369 (2005).
Retirement Planning. James M.
Poterba discusses the risks that
retirement savers participating in
401(k) plans face in his article,
Individual Decision Making and Risk in
Defined Contribution Plans, 13 Elder
L.J. 285 (2005).
Same-Sex Couples. In Equality at the
End: Amending State Surrogacy Statutes
to Honor Same-Sex Couples' End-of-Life
Decisions, 13 Elder L.J. 255 (2005),
Rebecca K. Glatzer examines and
evaluates the various statutory
approaches to surrogate decision
making to effectuate the health care
wishes of same-sex couples.
Settlor's Enforcement Right. A
settlor's ability to enforce the terms of
an irrevocable trust is the question
explored by Michael R. Houston in
his article, Estate of Wall v.
Commissioner: An Answer to the
Problem of Settlor Standing in Trust
Law?, 99 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1723 (2005).
Trustee Removal. In her article,
Changing Horses: Some Thoughts on the
Removal of Trustees, 18 Quinnipiac
Prob. L.J. 273 (2005), Gayle B. Wilhelm




With just one call.
removal and some of the issues aris-
ing from Connecticut's recent legisla-
tive changes.
Vermont. Should Vermont adopt the
Uniform Probate Code? That is the
issue analyzed by Stephanie J.
Willbanks in her article, Parting Is
Such Sweet Sorrow, But Does It Have to
Be So Complicated? Transmission of
Property at Death in Vermont, 29 Vt. L.
Rev. 895 (2005).
Massachusetts enacts Uniform
Principal and Income Act. 2005 Mass.
Legis. Serv. 129.
Michigan modernizes various pro-
bate laws. Michigan modified its dis-
claimed interest statute to explain the
effect of a disclaimer by a donee of a
power of appointment. The statute
also clarified that a personal represen-
tative, conservator, or trustee may
hire an attorney who is associated
with the personal representative, con-
servator, or trustee and may act on
the attorney's recommendation with-
out independent investigation. 2005
Mich. Legis. Serv. 204.
New York clarifies that creditors of a
donee of a power of appointment may
not attach the assets subject to a
power that may be exercised in favor
of the donee's maintenance, educa-
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